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Unsustainable Authoritarian Theater: Performative Governance and Media
in China
Olivia Zeiner Morrish

The strength and endurance of Chinese authoritarianism has captured international
attention, enticing speculations of supremacy or collapse. In this paper, I show that the same
tactics that support short-term stability, by upholding an illusion of accountability and good
governance, threaten the future of China’s authoritarian regime. First, I use the concept of
performative governance to illustrate the careful image maintenance done by Chinese officials
and agencies. Next, I evaluate the Chinese media, which is instrumental in maintaining this
grand illusion. While censorship does strengthen the authoritarian regime, both state-allied
journalists and media narratives surrounding the legal system place the state under immense
performance pressure, threatening its future. Finally, as the gap between expectations and results
continues to widen, I show that there is immense potential for rightful resistance in Chinese
society. The same tactics that support short-term stability and legitimacy—performative
governance, state-partnership with journalists, and the propagandizing of legal narratives—
ultimately threaten the future of Chinese authoritarianism, by escalating public expectations and
unsustainable theater, creating potential for rightful resistance. As pressure mounts, the Chinese
state will ultimately be forced to make substantive change, or else to grapple with the
consequences of a fading illusion.
In “Performative Governance,” Iza Ding (2020) explains a key element of Chinese
authoritarianism: by theatrically deploying language, symbols, and gestures, the state maintains
an illusion of accountability (530). This illusion brings short term stability to the state but poses
long term consequences. Ding explains that performative governance is most likely to occur
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when public scrutiny is high, but bureaucratic capacity is too low to truly achieve the desires of
the people. In China’s large and fragmented state, local bureaucracies are endowed with highly
varied degrees of infrastructural power and political clout (534). This is seen in “Lakeville,” the
city Ding uses to illustrate performative governance. As environmental petitions, protests, and
complaints increased in Lakeville, the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) lacked the
capacity to resolve public grievances (535). Instead, the EPB focused on small things: attitudes,
gestures, and intentions. Ding identifies three primary mechanisms by which the Chinese state
“performs” governance in front of an audience of citizens. First, bureaucrats aim to maintain an
image of responsiveness, by investigating and responding to every complaint in a timely manner.
In fact, EPB employees spent about 75 percent of their working hours addressing citizen
complaints (539). This responsiveness is entirely symbolic, for employees do not actually resolve
the underlying problem, and often they do not even attempt to (540). A second element of
performative governance is the demonstration of benevolent intentions, in which the state
displays concern, care, and submission to its people. Ding describes EPB officials as apologetic,
and even therapist-like, listening quietly while angry citizens berated them (541). Thirdly,
performance means publicity; complaints were quickly published and investigated by the EPB,
with dramatized stories (inspectors braving the snow or outsmarting evasive polluters) posted
online (541). Through these different mechanisms, the Chinese government projects a carefully
curated image of responsiveness and accountability.
By obscuring its inability to deliver substantive results, performative governance attempts
to placate the people and stabilize the regime. However, this system of governance threatens the
long-term durability of the regime, by elevating public expectations and perpetuating a difficult
information game. As the government performs responsiveness and accountability, citizens raise
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their expectations, leading to more theater. Ding writes that “impression management is an
iterated information game—a potentially infinite cycle of concealment, discovery, false
revelation, and rediscovery, in which the witness is likely to have the advantage over the actor”
(Ding 2020, 549). How long can this cycle continue? Ding suggests that the cycle is not truly
infinite: as citizens continue to scrutinize the government and elevate their expectations, they put
pressure on the government to deliver substantive results. Dickson (2018) also demonstrates the
hazards of short-term placation that raises expectations—appeasing the public and mitigating
protest brings temporary stability, but at a certain point, the government cannot continue to meet
ever increasing expectations. Empty theatrics will not sustain the Chinese regime forever—time
is running out.
In addition to the performative behaviors of officials and agencies, the Chinese state
attempts to sustain its illusion of accountability and good governance through media control.
When governance is performative, public perception is crucial, and the role of the media is
elevated. According to Ding, “the extent to which performative governance appeases critical
citizens may be conditional on the information available to the audience” (2020, 549). This
frames an important question: can China’s censorship regime and media control mitigate the
long-term threats posed by performative governance? China’s impressive censorship regime
makes obtaining accurate and unbiased information incredibly difficult and costly. In Censored,
Roberts (2018) describes two censorship strategies employed: friction and flooding. Friction
obstructs information by increasing the costs of accessing information. Banned websites can only
be accessed through a Virtual Private Network (VPN), and VPNs can be expensive, as well as
painfully slow and frustrating to use. Because it is difficult to access unbiased information,
internet users turn favorable Chinese websites. The Chinese state also overwhelms the
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information environment through a tactic called flooding. By launching coordinated, celebrity
focused media campaigns to distract from timely crisis or hiring paid commenters to write progovernment content online, China hides unfavorable information. Chinese censorship is
incredibly powerful—it makes unbiased information inaccessible for most of the population.
Because critical citizens lack accurate information about the regime, censorship bolsters
performative governance and strengthens China’s authoritarian regime, enhancing prospects of
durability. However, other elements of Chinese media ultimately overwhelm the positive effects
of censorship and threaten China’s future.
While Chinese censorship supports the regime, state-allied journalists push for gradual
political transformation. Repnikova (2018) illustrates the distinctly dangerous relationship that
the Chinese state has with its journalists. She compares China to Russia, where journalists openly
antagonize and critique the system. The mode of resistance seen in Russia creates greater shortterm risk for authoritarian regimes, as evident by Russian protests in 2011. Because the Chinese
state is focused on curating and maintaining its image, it co-opts journalists. Journalists are
positioned as partners of the state: they aid in enforcing local accountability, channeling societal
concerns, and incorporating solutions (48). However, as regime collaborators, journalists make
use of official channels and align their long-term objectives and visions for political change with
that of the central state. While the journalists are not explicitly oppositional, they do not stray
from contention, and “they actively attempt to outrun censorship, spill their stories online, work
with civil society actors to mound pressure on the state, and even occasionally openly protest
censorship” (48). Repnikova argues that this more subdued and collaborative form of
contestation poses an immense challenge for authoritarian rulers in the long run (56). As insiders
gradually pushing for political transformation, journalists threaten the regime. China’s
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commitment to its image of responsiveness and control poses further challenges. While the
Russian state can manage critical voices by ignorance or suppression, the Chinese state is
“forced into a cycle of responsiveness to public demands by co-opting critical voices into the
party’s nexus” (56). Repnikova finds that, as Ding illustrated, the Chinese people expect a
responsive central state, invested in addressing societal issues (56). Performative governance
places the Chinese state under constant performance pressure, which is amplified by the
journalists that are contesting the Chinese system from within and threatening its durability.
By propagandizing citizens’ experiences in the legal system, Chinese media attempts to
strengthen its illusion of accountability, but once again, this proves unsustainable. In recent
years, a widespread legal dissemination campaign has aimed to foster ideas of trust and
legitimacy in the legal system. Stockmann and Gallagher (2011) describe a pervasive media
narrative, “bad apples but happy endings,” in which workers encounter bad apples—sneaky
bosses, and so on—rather than systemic flaws (445). After turning to the legal system, the
workers win a hard-fought battle. Du Linxiang’s story illustrates this narrative; after Du was
fired without compensation for 35 years of tenure, he fought back through legal action. His case
was widely reported on, and after he was awarded severance by the Intermediate Court, Du’s
victory was widely celebrated. However, one year after the decision, Du reported that he had yet
to receive any compensation, a detail excluded from media portrayals. Stories like Du’s, along
with other media, like legal TV shows, foster trust in China’s legal system and inspire many
others to pursue justice through the legal route. Stockmann and Gallagher find that individuals
are highly susceptible to this media messaging. However, this susceptibility is largely dependent
on two temporal factors: a lack of conflicting sources of information and a lack of previous
experience with the reformed legal system (437). Labor law and emphasis on workplace rights
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are both new issues in China, which means that citizens do not have access to firsthand accounts
of the legal process that conflict with overly positive media messaging. However, this newness
will dissipate. As firsthand accounts spread, the failings of the legal system will be exposed. As
the Chinese state lacks the capacity successfully regulate the workplace and enforce judicial
decisions, confidence in the legal system is likely to erode. Once again, the media poses a threat
to the future of China’s performative governance.
The potential for rightful resistance in Chinese society poses further threat to the
authoritarian regime. O’Brien (2006) describes rightful resistance as a form of popular
contention that draws on laws, policies, and other officially promoted values (33). Rightful
resisters assert their claims through approved channels, combining legal tactics through political
pressure. They work within the system opportunistically to confront power holders, piercing the
hegemony at its weakest point (55). Rightful resisters frame their claims and justify their
defiance by turning to the rights or protections in implied in ideologies or conferred by
policymakers (33). They capitalize on the state’s failure to provide what was promised. O’Brien
writes that “so long as a gap exists between rights promised and rights delivered, there is always
room for rightful resistance to emerge” (55). The Chinese authoritarian regime continues to
overpromise and underdeliver. As EPB officials work hard to maintain an image of
responsiveness, citizens continue to raise their expectations. Similarly, dramatized narratives of
legal victories elevate popular expectations of the Chinese court system. There is a huge
disparity between what is promised and what citizens experience, creating expansive potential
for rightful resistance. Furthermore, structural features already support rightful resistance in
China. Journalists work within state institutions to push for gradual change. As legal knowledge
is disseminated, and people bring more workplace claims to court, they gain greater knowledge
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of the legal system, and observe its failings firsthand. Might the Chinese regime unwittingly
cultivate a culture of resistance? In the short term, rightful resistance might not pose the same
threat as explosive protest, but as pressure increases over time, Chinese authoritarianism is at
risk.
An illusion of accountable and responsive governance, bolstered by a powerful
censorship regime, has stabilized China’s regime thus far. Yet, the performative governance and
media control that brings short-term stability to the Chinese authoritarian regime continue to
elevate public expectations to unattainable standards. If the government continues to escalate its
theatrical performance, without substantive change, then the gap between what is promised and
what is delivered will only expand, creating greater potential for rightful resistance. The theater
of Chinese authoritarianism is unsustainable: as state-partnered journalists apply pressure from
the inside, media narratives lose their hold on the legal system, and the state fails to deliver what
is expected, the regime faces an uncertain and alarming future, in which it will be forced to
grapple with the long-term consequences of its superficial, image focused governance.
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